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  Abstract:  Change is in the air in Japan, claim many observers:  the government 
is radically deregulating crucial sectors of the economy, the large firms are unwinding 
their keiretsu corporate groups, and firms and banks are dismantling their main bank 
arrangements.  Some observers see all three as exogenous institutional shocks, while 
others treat the last two as behavioral responses to the first.  In fact, although the first 
phenomenon would constitute an institutional change if it occurred, it has not -- for 
Japanese bureaucrats had no substantial regulatory power to abandon.  Although the last 
two would constitute market responses if they occurred, they have not either -- for firms 
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  Can Japan change its ways, asked a recent Brookings study (Carlile & Tilton, 
1998a).  Can it (Carlile & Tilton, 1998b: v) "dismantle its developmentalist regulations so 
as to open its markets meaningfully ... ?"   
  Its markets may or may not be open, reply many journalists, scholars, and 
commentators, but regulators have indeed begun to dismantle.  Since the 1990 stock and 
real-estate market collapse, institutional change has run rampant:  bureaucrats have cut 
the role they play in several crucial industries; the keiretsu corporate groups have started 
to unwind their ties; and firms and banks have begun to dismantle their main-bank 
relationships.  Some observers describe all three phenomena as exogenous institutional 
shocks.  Others characterize the last two as rational responses to the first.  All seem to 
agree that all this has in fact occurred.  
  In fact, none of this occurred.  Bureaucrats have not substantially abandoned their 
control over the economy -- for they had little control to abandon.  The keiretsu firms 
have not unravelled their groups -- for they had no groups to unravel.  And firms and 
banks have not dismantled the main bank system -- for they maintained no system to 
dismantle.  Studying the effect of regulatory change on market behavior is fine, but only 
if one rightly identifies the regulatory framework economic actors face, and the market 
choices they make.  In post-war Japan, most observers have done neither. 
  We begin by distinguishing institutional change and market response (Section I).  
We then discuss the power Japanese bureaucrats wielded over the economy (Section II), 
the etymology of the keiretsu (Section III.A), and the substance of Japanese bank-firm 
relations (Section III.B). 
 
I.  Introduction: 
A.  Why Institutions Matter: 
  For empiricists, institutional change promises a godsend, a gold mine of articles 
begging to be written.  Absent that change, they likely face an equilibrium, and equilibria 
seldom generate interesting results.  Change institutions, and results start turning 
publishable. 
  Institutional change shifts observed equilibria because institutions shape the 
choices people make.  More specifically, institutions structure the relative payoffs to the 
alternatives people face.  Change those payoffs, and people will begin to change the 
options they choose.  Change institutions, and changes in observed behavior will follow 
 
B.  What Institution?  
  Properly to make sense of the changes they see, however, empiricists will need 
properly to distinguish institutions from behavior.  The distinction may be harder than it 
sounds.  Confuse the two (confuse the constraints actors face, with the choices they make 
in response), and they risk turning the analysis tautological.   Years ago, reminisces 
Clifford Geertz (1973: 249-50), Talcott Parsons warned legions of students that 
“interpret[ing] the way a group of human beings behave as an expression of their culture 
while defining their culture as the sum of the ways in which they have learned to behave 
is not terribly informative.”  Alas, interpreting the choices people make as a result of Chapter 6:  Page 3 
institutional constraints while defining those institutions as the sum of the behavior they 
choose is not much better. 
  In studying economic choice, scholars can usually take the state-enforced 
regulatory framework as an institutional given.  Obviously, the regulatory framework is 
not exogenous to all analysis.  Voters choose legislators, and legislators pass regulatory 
statutes and hire regulators.  To study that political process, scholars would not want to 
take the regulatory framework itself as given.  Yet to study the choices economic actors 
make within market settings, in most cases they safely can take the regulatory structure as 
exogenous.   
  Although as an “institution” the regulatory framework is properly exogenous to 
economic market analysis, the choices the actors make within that framework are not.  A 
firm may choose whether to borrow from Bank A or Bank B.  It may choose whether to 
borrow from one bank or several, whether to negotiate a short-term loan or long-, 
whether to make a given component within the firm or to buy it on the market.  All these 
choices it makes within the institutional context; the choices do not themselves provide 
that context. 
 
C.  Japanese Institutions:  
  Now recall the purported institutional changes commentators describe in 
contemporary Japan:  (i) widespread economic deregulation, (ii) the dismantling of the 
keiretsu, and (iii) the collapse of the main bank system.  In time, we shall return to the 
question of whether any of this occurred.  Preliminarily, consider which of the supposed 
changes involve institutions.  
  As noted in above, the first of the three is indeed institutional.  Except to the 
political scientist, any deregulation is exogenously institutional.  Because the regulatory 
framework structures the relative payoffs to the choices market actors make, any change 
in those payoffs constitutes institutional change. 
  Yet observers often describe the changes to the keiretsu and main bank systems as 
institutional as well.  Paul Milgrom and John Roberts (1994: 32) describe the keiretsu as 
the “institutionalized form” of the “long-term relations that exist among Japanese 
companies.”  Thomas Cargill (2001: 146) describes “the keiretsu or main bank system” 
as a set of institutions, and so too do Magnus Blomstroem, Byron Gangnes and Sumner 
La Croix (2001: 7).   
  In fact, neither keiretsu nor main banks are institutional.  Keiretsu firms allegedly 
tie themselves to each other through shareholdings, loans, and trades.  They invest, 
borrow, buy and sell with the firms they do, however, by choice.  The term “keiretsu” 
merely captures the observed consequences of the choices they purportedly make.   
  Exactly the same point applies to the main bank system.  Japanese firms choose 
whether to borrow from one bank rather than another.  They choose how much to borrow 
from banks, and how much to finance through equity, through trade credit, and through 
loans from insurance firms.  Banks choose whether, how much, and to whom to lend.  
Banks and firms together negotiate the many terms and the resulting price of the loans 
they actually conclude.  The term "main bank system" merely captures the observed 
consequence of the many deals they supposedly cut. 
  None of this is affected by the fact that a firm structures the options it faces in 
later periods through the choices it makes in the present.  To be sure, a firm that enters a Chapter 6:  Page 4 
long-term arrangement (whether group trades or bank loans) in t1 will find its cost-
effective options limited in t2.  Yet that it does so does not transform the initial choice 
into an “institution.”  In choosing among its options, a rational firm present-values the 
costs it expects to incur in the future, and the benefits it expects to accrue.  Long-term or 
short-, the choice remains a choice -- the response it made to its institutional context 
rather than part of the institutional context itself. 
  Suppose, then, that peculiarities in the Japanese regulatory framework drove firms 
and banks to chose the behavior that led observers to posit main banks and keiretsu.  If 
the government changed that framework, those firms and banks might plausibly make 
other choices.  In so doing, they might plausibly choose behavior that observers would 
now characterize as a “break down” in the keiretsu and main bank system.   
  That break down, of course, is exactly what many observers claim to observe.  As 
we explain below, they claim wrongly.  They rightly note that contemporary firms do not 
structure their actions within keiretsu, and that banks do not follow the dictates of main-
bank theory.  They wrongly conclude that they ever did anything else.   
 
II.  Deregulation in Japan: 
A.  Introduction 
  Few changes in contemporary Japan capture as much attention as the purported 
deregulation.  Japan had long assigned, the recent Brookings study explained (Carlile & 
Tilton, 1998b: 9), "high levels of discretion" to its regulators and maintained "a high 
degree of informality in administrative activities."  That discretion and informality, in 
turn, had "extend[ed] well beyond that which is stipulated in laws."  Through the 
resulting web of informal regulation (area specialists call it "administrative guidance"), 
"Japanese officials [had] actively pursued industrial policies that encourage[d] 
concentration and oligopolistic practices." 
  Had Japan done this?  In fact, it had not.  Western scholars do not err in positing a 
relatively competitive, unregulated economy in current Japan; they err in positing that 
since 1950 it has been anything else.  They do not err in positing a deregulated economy 
in the current; they err in positing a rigidly regulated economy in the past. 
  We begin by exploring the three cases most often cited to illustrate the ostensibly 
heavy hand of the bureaucracy (Section B).  We then outline how Japanese courts treat 
bureaucratic intervention (Section B), and how the government regulated the financial 
markets (Section C).  Finally, we discuss the loan program (Section D) and limits on 
foreign exchange transactions (Section E) by which bureaucrats purportedly enforced 
their policy preferences.  
    
B.  Three Case Studies: 
  As with so much western scholarship on Japan, the work on government power 
depends heavily on anecdote.  Given the massive government power observers posit, one 
might have expected a correspondingly massive number of anecdotes.  Not so.  Instead, 
in the English-language press the legend hinges primarily on one:  the mid-1960s 
confrontation between MITI (the Ministry of International Trade & Industry) and 
Sumitomo Metals Industries.  In the Japanese press, observers add two others:  the 
disputes involving the Nisshin spinning and Idemitsu oil firms.   
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  1. Sumitomo Metals. -- a.  The legend.  To most Western observers, MITI used its 
1965 dispute with Sumitomo Metals to show firms what it could and would do to those 
that flouted its will.  It enjoyed more power at the time than it would ever again, they 
explain, because of its power over foreign exchange.  The statutes governing the field 
delegated such broad discretion to it that it could use that power to enforce even entirely 
unrelated dictates.  So broadly did they delegate that the ministry could, as the Japanese 
aphorism put it, “take Edo’s revenge in Nagasaki.”   
  In early 1965, observers typically begin, Japanese steel makers faced a drop in 
demand.  To address the problem, they organized a trade association committee, and that 
committee reported to MITI.  In turn, MITI ordered it to organize a cartel to prevent 
“excess competition.”  
  Through the committee, MITI then coordinated production cuts.  It expected firms 
in the industry to comply, and most planned to do just that.  Sumitomo Metals, however, 
wanted to produce more.  By the fall of 1965, it decided to act alone.  The cartel, it 
announced, it would ignore.  Instead, it would produce as it wished.   
  MITI was not about to suffer independent firms.  If Sumitomo thought it could do 
as it pleased, it thought wrong.  Did not Sumitomo need coking coal?  Should the firm try 
to ignore the cartel, it -- MITI -- would cut the foreign exchange it needed to import that 
coal.  Absent coal Sumitomo could not make steel, and absent foreign exchange it could 
not buy coal.  Recognizing its hopeless position, Sumitomo caved.  Duly chastised, it 
pledged its cooperation. 
  For would-be renegades, the moral was clear.  Should they buck MITI’s 
leadership, MITI could and would retaliate.  Even over matters that had nothing to do 
with foreign exchange, the ministry could and would use its power over that exchange to 
enforce compliance.  By making an example of Sumitomo Metals, concluded Frank 
Upham (1987: 176), the ministry showed any firm with dreams of independence that it 
could and would manipulate its “abstract legal powers” to “ensure compliance.”   
Vehemently, it demonstrated that it faced “virtually no statutory restrictions on [its] 
regulation of foreign trade” (id.: 179).   
 
  b.  The history.  As critical a rhetorical role as the tale of Sumitomo Metals may 
play, the tale is too tall by half.  If MITI enjoyed any control over foreign exchange, it 
had not used it earlier to induce firms to accept its unrelated dictates.  It did not start now.  
And if Sumitomo Metals faced any vulnerability, it did not show it now.  Instead, it 
refused to back down, and within a few weeks MITI capitulated. 
 
 MITI's  role.  At root, the tale of Sumitomo Metals is simply false.  Begin with the 
question of why MITI intervened.  The ministry did not intervene to implement any 
“industrial policy”  Instead, it intervened to enforce a private cartel.   
  Steel firms had cartelized their market for several years.  Sumitomo Metals, 
however, increasingly found the quotas unsatisfactory.  Having invested aggressively in 
new facilities, it wanted a chance to expand its market share.  Domesticly, it was willing 
to follow quotas.  Overseas, it wanted none (Asahi, 7/13/65; Mainichi, 11/16/65).
1  
Nonetheless, in mid-1965 it agreed again to acquiesce.  With the lone dissident in line, 
the others set the quotas for the second fiscal quarter (July-Sept., 1965):  production 
                     
1 Parenthetical references are to contemporary newspapers. Chapter 6:  Page 6 
volumes set at 90 percent of the amounts they had each sold sold during the previous 
fiscal year's uncartelized third quarter.   
  The steel producers needed to agree not just on price and quantity, but on 
enforcement as well.  If they formed a private agreement, they faced potential criminal 
liability.  They could avoid that risk by forming a "depression cartel" under the Antitrust 
Act, but could not then enforce the cartel's terms on any dissident.  To avoid criminal 
liability while enforcing compliance, they instead decided to ask MITI to enforce their 
arrangement unofficially (Asahi, 7/13/65; 12/16/65).  In the process, reasoned they 
(wrongly, as we explain below), they would both bind recalcitrant firms and protect 
themselves from criminal charges. 
  Despite its acquiescence, Sumitomo Metals continued to press for export 
exclusions.  When by November its competitors still refused, it simply withdrew from the 
cartel.  Exclusions or no exclusions, it would sell as it pleased.  MITI promptly ordered it 
to comply with the cartel, but Sumitomo indignantly replied that "production cutbacks 
should be decided strictly by agreement among the firms" (Mainichi, 11/16/65)  Let MITI 
try to enforce the cartel, it declared.  "We intend immediately to file suit" (Nikkei, 
11/28/65).   
 
 The  punishment.  MITI faced a defiant Sumitomo Metals, but it did not punish the 
firm.  It did not even try.  Although it threatened to punish the firm, it never did.  Instead, 
it simply caved.   
  To force Sumitomo Metals to comply, MITI would have had to take measures far 
more drastic than it even threatened.  Suppose it gave Sumitomo only enough foreign 
exchange to buy the coking coal it needed for the authorized steel.  Given that Sumitomo 
maintained a full two months' worth of coking coal in reserve (Nikkei, 11/20/65), it could 
safely have ignored the cartel for another 20 months. 
  Even if MITI tried to exhaust its coal reserves, declared Sumitomo, it still would 
not comply.  At that point it would just import pig iron directly (Nikkei, 11/20/65).  After 
all, by the mid-1960s, it faced no limits on pig iron imports (or other imports, as we detail 
in Section D.3).  Coal imports were subject to the foreign exchange limits only because 
of the role mining villages played in keeping the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in 
power. 
 
 The  victor.  Ultimately, Sumitomo -- not MITI -- won the dispute.   
Notwithstanding the many accounts to the contrary, MITI did not obtain the result it 
wanted.  Sumitomo did. 
  Most basically, Sumitomo Metals wanted steel exports outside the quotas.  It did 
not object to cartels in principle.  It wanted a cartel in the domestic market, and the ability 
to sell as it pleased abroad.  Eventually, that was exactly the framework MITI and the 
steel industry offered it. 
   MITI talked conciliation from the start.  Already in early December it announced 
it would consider keeping the export market uncartelized (Mainichi, 12/3/65).  In its 
January deal with Sumitomo, it did just that.  During the third quarter (Oct.-Dec., 1965), 
Sumitomo had exceeded its quota by 88,000 tons, and of that excess had exported 55,000 
tons.  For the next quarter, MITI forgave Sumitomo the exported 55,000 tons, and docked Chapter 6:  Page 7 
it only by the 33,000-ton excess (Nikkei, 1/12/66).  Less than two months after declaring 
defiance, Sumitomo had obtained what it wanted. 
  Defiance paid.  Soon, Sumitomo Metals tried the ploy again.  When market 
demand rose unexpectedly in early 1966, Sumitomo decided that even its revised quotas 
cut profitability.  Rather than comply with the cartel to which it had just agreed, it 
decided to go its own way.  Its rivals complained, but to no avail.  "Even if the industry 
decides to continue the crude steel adjustments into October," announced the Sumitomo 
president, "we do not intend to comply" (Nikkei, 8/25/66).  By their original terms, the 
cartel would have lasted through September.  Duly chastened, MITI dropped the quotas 
at the end of Augsut (Nikkei, 8/30/66). 
 
 
 2.  Nisshin  Spinning. -- According to some accounts of Japanese bureaucratic 
power, in the mid-1960s MITI not only intervened to enforce its policies on a non-
compliant Sumitomo Metals, it enforced them on the Nisshin cotton-spinning firm too.  
Through early 1966, 174 spinning firms had maintained a “depression cartel” authorized 
by the Antimonopoly Act.  With the cartel expiring at the end of March, MITI proposed 
to extend it.  When Nisshin refused to cooperate, it intervened and pressured the firm to 
comply.  Nisshin recanted, and MITI obtained its cartel. 
  In fact, MITI did not actively pressure Nisshin.  First, the textile industry was too 
widely dispersed.  In cotton spinning 350 legal firms (i.e., excluding the black-market 
firms, discussed below) competed, and the top 13 produced only half the industry output 
(1966 figures; Tsusho, 1966: 24).  Second, MITI had no obvious way to compel 
compliance.  At least in steel it could plausibly threaten to cut Sumitomo’s coking coal.  
In cotton spinning Nisshin had been able freely to import what it wanted since 1961.  
Last, on a long-run basis MITI did not want to cartelize the industry (Nikkei, 1/26/66, 
2/3/66).  Through the 1950s, it had allocated the foreign exchange for raw cotton imports 
among the spinning firms according to the number of spindles they registered.  In 1961 it 
voluntarily abandoned that power.  It did not do so because it had to abandon it.  It 
abandoned it to further the LDP's largely free-market policies. 
  Although the LDP relied in part on small firms for political support, it set its 
small-business policies within a capitalist, free-market context.  Japanese voters did not 
want an interventionist government, and the LDP knew that.  Socialist and Communist 
candidates regularly offered them interventionist alternatives, and they regularly rejected 
them.  Reflecting their policy preferences, the LDP instead maintained a fundamentally 
non-interventionist course.  As its faithful agent, so did MITI. 
  Nisshin opposed the planned cartel, but for the same reasons that the other big 
firms opposed it too (Mainichi, l/21/66; Nikkei, 1/23/66, 1/26/66).  First, the cartel 
favored the less efficient firms.  Fundamentally, the industry had too much capacity.  Of 
the 12.8 million total spindles, industry insiders estimated that only three-quarters would 
survive in a competitive market.  The cartel mandated production cutbacks, but because it 
mandated them uniformly they fell on the efficient and inefficient alike.  If the industry 
could eliminate the cartel, market competition would instead force the cutbacks on the 
inefficient firms -- eventually driving them out of business.  What the larger firms (and 
MITI) wanted were policies that tracked that market competition (Nikkei, 2/15/66).   Chapter 6:  Page 8 
  Second, the cartel favored the black-market shops and the legal firms that had not 
joined the cartel.  Since the 1950s, firms could legally spin cotton thread only on those 
spindles they registered with the government.  That ban, however, the government had 
enforced haphazardly, if at all -- resulting in an estimated 500,000 unregistered spindles 
by the mid-1960s (Mainichi, 1/21/66).  Yet the cartel applied only to participating firms.  
The black-market firms obviously did not participate, and neither did over 170 legal firms 
-- who probably used another half-million spindles (Tsusho, 1966a: 24).  By requiring 
only participating firms to cut back, the cartel effectively expanded the market into which 
the black-market and non-participating legal firms could sell.   
  At least before 1961 the black-market firms could not import raw cotton directly.  
Because they lacked registered spindles, MITI would not allocate them foreign exchange.  
Once MITI abandoned its control over cotton imports, they could freely obtain their 
cotton.  In truth, though, even under exchange controls MITI had not stopped firms from 
reselling the cotton they imported.  As a result, the less efficient legal firms had simply 
re-sold the cotton they imported to more efficient black-market firms.   
  Although Nisshin eventually acquiesced to the cartel, it did so only after the trade 
association and MITI gave it much of what it wanted.  It had hoped to eliminate all 
controls, and the association and MITI agreed to work toward that end.  Even the 
structure of the cartel reflected Nisshin’s aims.  In exchange for Nisshin’s cooperation, 
the association and MITI specified in the cartel that firms could sell on the market only 
70 percent of their output (Nikkei, 3/10/66).  Because the larger firms maintained 
vertically integrated weaving operations, the limit left them largely untouched (none of 
the ten largest firms sold 70 percent of their output on the market; Mainichi, 3/4/66).  It 
hit instead the independent smaller firms. 
  True to the LDP’s non-interventionist policies (and consistent with its actions in 
the Sumitomo Metals dispute), MITI never seriously tried to sway Nisshin.  When 
Nisshin first announced that it would not comply with a new cartel, MITI talked to 
Nisshin.  Never did the ministry never do more than talk.  Fundamentally, it agreed with 
Nisshin, but the smaller firms stood in its way.  By making its compliance with the cartel 
contingent on market-liberalization reforms, Nisshin gave MITI the leverage it needed to 
pursue policies it supported anyway. 
  As had Sumitomo Metals, Nisshin soon put the lessons it learned to further good 
use.  In the rayon fiber industry as well, in 1966 several firms tried to coordinate capacity 
cuts (Nisshin, 1969: 930).  Nisshin refused to cooperate, and the group dropped its 
proposal (Tsusansho, 1966b: 132).  When they raised it again the next year, several 
remaining firms did agree to scrap facilities.  Nisshin scrapped none (Tsusansho, 1967: 
142-43).  
 
  3.  Idemitsu kosan. -- From time to time, observers also use the dispute over 
Idemitsu kosan petroleum firm to tell the story of Japanese government power.  Readers 
should recognize the tale:  MITI ordered the industry to cut production, a nonconformist 
firm refused, MITI threatened to punish, and the firm complied.  The story did not 
describe Sumitomo, did not describe Nisshin, and does not describe Idemitsu kosan. 
  Through the 1950s, MITI had used its foreign exchange powers to control crude 
oil imports.  In October 1963, it lifted those controls and substituted the authority it Chapter 6:  Page 9 
gained through one of the few industry-specific post-war control statutes -- the 1962 
Petroleum Industry Act.
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  The Act gave MITI dubious control over short-term production.  It allowed the 
ministry to set five-year supply plans, to issue refining licenses, and to allocate new 
facility permits.  It required refiners to submit annual production plans to the ministry.  It 
authorized MITI both to recommend changes if those plans seemed excessive, and to 
determine non-binding standard sales prices.   
  Crucially, the Act authorized MITI neither to force firms to follow its production 
recommendations, nor to require that they follow its standard prices.  The 
recommendations it authorized were instead just that -- recommendations.  To force an 
adamant firm to comply, MITI would have needed to use its power over new investments 
to penalize non-compliance.  Hence the crucial issues:  could it have done so, and did it 
try? 
  For its suggested production plans, MITI sought to use quotas developed by the 
industry trade association, the Petroleum Federation.  As in cotton-spinning, however, the 
trade association was split.  The larger more efficient firms wanted a looser structure that 
rewarded firms for new investment -- if they wanted quotas at all.  Many of them, like 
Idemitsu kosan, wanted none.  The smaller less efficient firms wanted a straightforward 
cartel.  With the firms unable to agree among themselves, MITI found itself in a 
quandary.   
  For the October 1963-March 1964 period, MITI adopted quotas that largely 
tracked its April-September 1963 numbers.  Idemitsu kosan promptly refused to comply.  
It was the second biggest firm in the industry, and one of the most aggressive.  It had just 
opened a new plant in February, yet the quotas ignored the plant almost entirely.  We will 
“produce as much as we can sell,” announced company president Sazo Idemitsu.  MITI’s 
quotas “completely ignore our special circumstances” (Nikkei, 10/6/63). 
  Idemitsu kosan did not just refuse the quotas.  It cancelled its Federation 
membership, and on November 29, 1963, announced its withdrawal (Nikkei, 11/30/63).  
Repeatedly, MITI pleaded with it to rejoin and follow the quotas.  Repeatedly, it refused.  
Declared its president, the production restraints potentially violated the Antimonopoly 
Act (he was right, as we note below).  MITI pressure or no, he would never agree.  After 
all, the Petroleum Industry Act gave the ministry no authority to make him comply 
(Nikkei, 12/12/63).  Idemitsu “opposed the production adjustments themselves,” he 
explained.  “Unless those adjustments are themselves abolished, we cannot agree to any 
compromise” (Nikkei, 1/12/64). 
  MITI talked and pleaded, but -- crucially -- that was all it did.  Never did it 
threaten to penalize Idemitsu when next it applied for approval on new facilities.  Never 
did it threaten otherwise to penalize it for non-cooperation.  Instead, it recognized that it 
could not force Idemitsu kosan to comply.  As the minister himself told the press, the 
ministry hoped Idemitsu would compromise.  If it refused, he would issue a ministerial 
recommendation under the Petroleum Industry Act.  If it ignored the recommendation, 
there was nothing he could do (Nikkei, 1/14/64).  “Because a ministerial order carries no 
penalty or other legal force,” explained the Nikkei newspaper, “MITI believes that 
Idemitsu would ignore it and continue with its own production plans” (Nikkei, 1/19/64). 
                     
2 Sekiyu gyo ho [Petroleum Industry Act], Law. No. 128 of 1962. Chapter 6:  Page 10 
  A few days later, Idemitsu kosan did agree to quotas -- for the time being (Nikkei, 
1/25/64).  To induce it to agree, MITI promised to produce new quotas that reflected 
Idemitsu kosan’s concerns and hiked its allocation from 113,000 barrels a day to 131,000 
(Nikkei, 1/24/64).  Provided Idemitsu cut output during the low-demand summer months, 
calculated the Asahi newspaper, it could now produce almost what it could with no cartel 
at all (Asahi, 1/26/64).  As a further part of the deal, Idemitsu demanded that MITI agree 
to abolish production restraints as soon as possible. 
  Yet “as soon as possible” is not now -- and the persistence of the restraints proved 
the deal’s undoing.  From the outset, MITI refused to say when it would actually abolish 
them (Nikkei, 1/24/64).  Neither would Idemitsu kosan rejoin the Federation until it did.  
Instead, when sailors struck the next year, Idemitsu used the pretext to cancel the deal.  
Consumers needed their oil, it declared.  With supplies now uncertain it would again 
produce whatever it could sell.  Over the intervening year MITI had raised its quota to 
192,000 barrels a day.  It would produce 240,000 (Mainichi, 1/21/66). 
  MITI pleaded its case, but the company president seemed determined to kill the 
cartel.  “Ever since freeing crude oil imports,” he complained (Mainichi, 1/21/66), “MITI 
has used administrative guidance to control production.  Our firm left the Federation 
because we opposed this. ... We cooperated only on the condition that MITI promise to 
abolish the production controls ....  That promise it still has not kept.”   
  This time MITI did keep its promise and Idemitsu cooperated.  As soon as the 
sailors returned to work, Idemitsu agreed again to the cartel (Nikkei, 2/1/66).  MITI 
abolished the price controls at the end of the month (Nikkei, 2/2/66) and the production 
restraints at the end of the next biannual period.  With the restraints dead at the end of 
September, Idemitsu kosan rejoined the Federation.   
 
C.  Judicial Review of Bureaucratic Intervention: 
  1.  Introduction. -- According to the anecdotes recounted in Section B, 
bureaucrats used the power they had in one area to force firms to comply with their 
dictates in another.  According to the facts, they did nothing of the sort.  According to the 
facts, they did not even try.   
  Bureaucrats did not use unrelated retaliation to induce compliance for two 
reasons:  the courts would not have let them retaliate, and they had few powers (even 
unrelated powers) that they could have manipulated anyway.  We turn to the latter in 
Section D, and focus first on the discretion courts gave bureaucrats:  on their willingness 
to review informal regulatory measures (i.e., “administrative guidance”; Section 2), on 
the legality of those informal measures (Sections 3 and 4), and on criminal liability for 
complying with illegal regulatory measures (Subsection 5). 
 
  2.  Justiciability of informal regulation. -- Despite occasional references in the 
literature to the contrary, when MITI regulated informally it did not do so to avoid 
judicial review.  It regulated informally for the same reason most regulators everywhere 
regulate informally:  informality saves costs.   
  MITI could not have stayed informal to avoid judicial review, because informality 
would not have stopped that review.  If a Japanese firm wants to contest an informal 
instruction in court, it need simply ignore it.  By doing so, it will force the government’s Chapter 6:  Page 11 
hand.  To induce it to comply, the government will then need to take more formal steps.  
When it does, in most cases courts will review what it does.   
  This is not peculiar to Japan.  Rather, it is as true in the U.S. as in Japan.  If an 
American firm wants to contest an informal government action, it must first force the 
government’s hand.  Until it does, American courts will not review the action.  When it 
does, they generally will.  The point is true in the U.S.  It is true as well in Japan. 
 
  3. The case law on informal regulation. -- Nothing better illustrates the way 
Japanese courts handle informal regulatory measures than the travails of Musashino 
mayor Kihachiro Goto.  In late 1971, Motoharu Yamada marched into Goto’s office.  As 
a bedroom Tokyo suburb Musashino had boomed over the last decade, and as head of the 
local Yamaki construction firm Yamada had played his part.  He built condominium 
buildings.  Now, however, the city wanted his money.   
  As Goto explained it, the city wanted developers like Yamada to do two things:  
to get their neighbors’ consent before they built new buildings, and to donate money for 
school facilities.  If they potentially inconvenienced their neighbors, they should make 
sure those neighbors did not mind.  If they packed more students into the already 
crowded schools, they should do their part to build more.  Many Musashino voters 
opposed the new construction projects, and Goto owed his position to local voters.  
  Given that the Musashino government had made these demands informally, 
Yamada opted not to comply.  He continued to build his condominia.  Although he 
sometimes tried modestly to placate his neighbors, he seldom gave on issues that 
mattered and sued those neighbors who tried to block his crew.  When he did, the courts 
forthrightly ordered the neighbors to pay him damages.
3  Rarely did Yamada give to the 
city’s school fund either.  When the city stalled his applications in response, he sued it 
too.   
  Yet if Yamada could play to the courts, Goto (quintessentially, a politician) could 
play to the cameras.  When Yamada proved particularly obdurate, he went to the 
construction site personally.  With a handful of wet cement, he plugged Yamada’s water 
pipes.  Not that it stopped Yamada.  He simply marched back into court.  The city had a 
legal duty to provide the water, he demanded, regardless of whether he paid off his 
neighbors or donated to the schools.  The court agreed, and ordered Goto to unplug the 
pipes.
4 
  Alas for Goto, the local prosecutors noticed the dispute.  Rather than commend 
him for promoting the local welfare, they thought his behavior criminal.  He had a legal 
duty to run water to Yamada’s apartments, they reasoned, whether Yamada talked to his 
neighbors or not, whether he gave toward the schools or not.  Forthrightly, they filed 
criminal charges.  The Tokyo District Court convicted, and the Tokyo High Court 
affirmed.  By 1989, so did the Supreme Court.
5  In enforcing the city’s informal 
regulatory regime, Goto did not just break the law.  According to the Supreme Court, he 
committed a crime. 
                     
3 Yamaki kensetsu, K.K. v. Suzuki, 1151 Hanrei jiho 12 (Tokyo High Ct. Mar. 26, 1980). 
4 Yamaki kensetsu, K.K. v. Musashino, 803 Hanrei jiho 18 (Tokyo High Ct. Dec. 8, 1975). 
5 Kuni v. Goto, 1323 Hanrei jiho 16 (S. Ct. Nov. 7, 1989), aff’g 1166 Hanrei jiho 41 (Tokyo High 
Ct. Aug. 30, 1985), aff’g 1114 Hanrei jiho 10 (Tokyo D. Ct. Feb. 24, 1984). Chapter 6:  Page 12 
  Yamada then sued Goto on behalf of the city.  Under Japanese law, taxpayers can 
sue derivatively on behalf of their community those local officials who misuse funds.  
When the prosecutors filed charges against Goto, Musashino had paid his defense costs.  
After all, he was responsible for promoting the town’s welfare, and had made his 
demands on the contractors to carry out that responsibility.  To Yamada, however, the 
regulatory framework was illegal -- and if Goto broke the law in enforcing it, then the 
city broke the law in paying his legal fees.  As a Musashino taxpayer, he filed a taxpayer 
derivative suit to force Goto to refund his attorney’s fees.  Again Yamada won, and again 
the High Court and Supreme Court affirmed.
6   
  And still Yamada continued.  When Musashino tried to force the informal 
regulatory policies on him, argued Yamada, he incurred a variety of costs.  For those 
damages, the city owed him damages.  To the court, the case was easy.  It had already 
held the city’s actions illegal.  If Yamada had lost money, the city had a duty to pay.  This 
time, Musashino did not even bother to appeal.
7   
  In all this, Musashino’s policies were not unusual:  city governments had adopted 
them the country over.  Neither was the Tokyo District Court’s response (declare 
attempts to enforce the policies flatly illegal) unusual:  courts adopted it nearly 
everywhere too.  One developer applied to the Tokyo government for construction 
permits on a couple of condominium buildings.  The government cited opposition from 
his neighbors, and stalled.  The developer sued, and in 1982 won.
8  Another developer 
applied to the Kyoto prefectural government for a hotel building permit.  When the 
government told him to negotiate, he refused -- and this court declared the stalling illegal 
too.
9 
  By 1985, the Supreme Court entered the fray and announced that developers 
could freely ignore the informal policies.  When they did, city governments could not use 
their intransigence to delay their applications.
10  To be sure, it left open the possibility 
that a developer might act so obstreperously that a city could withhold its services after 
all.  Over the next several years, however, the courts made it clear it was a possibility in 
theory only.  Obnoxious developers came and went, but the courts refused to let cities 
stall applications.   
  By the early 1990s, the suits had become commonplace.  When a firm applied to 
Tochigi prefecture for a permit on an industrial waste plant, the government told it to 
obtain its neighbors’ consent.  The developer refused, sued for its permit, and won.
11  
Another developer applied to Yamanashi prefecture for a construction permit on vacation 
                     
6 Yamada v. Goto, 1354 Hanrei jiho 62 (S. Ct. Mar. 23, 1990), aff’g 1186 Hanrei jiho 46 (Tokyo 
High Ct. Mar. 26, 1986), aff’g 1080 Hanrei jiho 40 (Tokyo D. Ct. May 27, 1983). 
7 Yamaki kensetsu, K.K. v. Musashino, 1465 Hanrei jiho 106 (Tokyo D. Ct. Dec. 9, 1992). 
8 Fujisawa kensetsu, K.K. v. Tokyo, 1074 Hanrei jiho 80 (Tokyo D. Ct. Nov. 12, 1982). 
9 Sankei kanko, Y.G. v. Kyoto, 1116 Hanrei jiho 56 (Kyoto D. Ct. Jan. 19, 1984). 
10 Tokyo v. G.G. Nakaya honten, 1168 Hanrei jiho 45 (S. Ct. July 16, 1985). 
11 Shiroyama kankyo joka, Y.G. v. Tochigi, 1385 Hanrei jiho 42 (Utsunomiya D. Ct. Feb. 28, 
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condominiums.  The prefecture stalled on grounds that he had not cooperated, he sued, 
and he won.
12   
  A developer in northern Kyushu wanted a condominium complex in suburban 
Fukuoka.  The city told him to reduce the complex’s size.  He refused, sued, and won.
13  
Still others found their plans for a golf course or pinball parlor stymied by the informal 
policies, sued, and won.
14  The disputes continued even into the next decade -- when a 
resort condominium developer contested a local regulatory program and in 2001 won.
15   
 
  4.  The case law on foreign exchange. -- Although plaintiffs to these disputes over 
informal regulatory measures most commonly sued local governments, they did not 
always do so.  Sometimes they sued MITI, and in the 1960s at least one set of plaintiffs 
sued MITI over foreign exchange.  In deciding the case, the court did not tell MITI it 
could use its foreign exchange powers to punish the firm over unrelated matters.  It told 
MITI (and we know of no cases telling it anything else) the opposite:  the ministry could 
not use its power over foreign exchange to enforce unrelated policies.   
  As part of its cold-war strategy, the U.S. had organized "COCOM":  an informal 
agreement among allies not to export militarily sensitive equipment into the Soviet block.  
In the 1960s, however, an apparently leftist Japanese group proposed sending COCOM-
banned products to two Chinese trade fairs.  To do so, it needed foreign exchange 
clearance.  It applied to MITI, but rather than risk U.S.-retaliation MITI refused. 
  When the group sued MITI for the clearance, the court found for the group.  The 
foreign-exchange statutes gave MITI considerable discretion, reasoned the court.  Yet 
crucially, that discretion did not extend to non-economic concerns.  In refusing the 
foreign exchange to enforce non-statutory political concerns, MITI violated the law.  If 
MITI wanted to enforce COCOM, it needed a statute to that effect -- and a statute it did 
not have.  Accordingly, by denying foreign exchange to enforce COCOM-related 
concerns, it violated the law.
16 
 
  5.  Criminal liability for regulatory compliance. -- Not only did courts let firms 
challenge informal regulatory programs they hated, they refused to let firms use programs 
they liked to avoid criminal liability.  Take the oil firms.  Since the 1960s they had 
(haphazardly, given the opposition of firms like Idemitsu kosan) cut production and fixed 
prices.  They had managed their deals in the Petroleum Federation, and (like the steel 
firms) had tried to delegate enforcement to MITI.   
  In turn, MITI had implemented their cartel through informal regulatory policies.  
The Fair Trade Commission (FTC), however, decided that the arrangement violated the 
antitrust statute and launched criminal prosecutions.  In 1980 the trial court 
                     
12 Arakawa kensetsu kogyo, K.K. v. Yamanashi, 1457 Hanrei jiho 85 (Kofu D. Ct. Feb. 24, 1992). 
13 Toho jutaku sangyo, K.K. v. Shime, 1438 Hanrei jiho 118 (Fukuoka D. Ct Feb. 13, 1992). 
14 K.K. Yasu koporeeshon v. Ego, 1634 Hanrei jiho 84 (Osaka High Ct. May 27, 1997) (golf 
course); Odaka v. Funabashi, 1513 Hanrei jiho 145 (Chiba D. Ct. Nov. 19, 1993) (pachinko parlor). 
15 Daisei kikaku v. Gunma, 1757 Hanrei jiho 81 (Tokyo High Ct. July 16, 2001).  
16 1969 nen, 560 Hanrei jiho at 21-22. Chapter 6:  Page 14 
straightforwardly convicted the firms.
17  Never mind that MITI had told them to follow 
the pricefixing schedule, explained the court.  Never mind either that the Petroleum 
Industry Act authorized it to advise them to cut output or to set resale prices.  Given that 
they could have ignored MITI’s instructions had they wanted, in using the ministry to 
enforce their cartel’s terms they fixed prices -- and pricefixing constituted a crime. 
   On appeal, in 1984 the Supreme Court duly affirmed.
18  Firms need not follow 
informal regulatory programs, it noted.  Precisely because compliance is voluntary, the 
programs will shield no one from criminal prosecution.  
  
D.  Regulatory Powers: 
  1.  Introduction. -- By most accounts, Japanese bureaucrats controlled an array of 
powerful measures, and enjoyed wide-ranging discretion in exercising them.  Through 
that combination of controls and discretion, they used their power over issue X to punish 
a firm that ignored their instructions on issue Y.  In the process, they manipulated the 
economy as they pleased.  
  In Section C we addressed bureaucratic discretion.  Turn now to the question of 
power.  Typically, Japan specialists claim that bureaucrats obtained their power through 
two sources:  their ability to ration credit in highly regulated capital markets, and their 
control (as noted above) over foreign exchange.  We begin with the former, and turn to 
the latter in Section 3.   
 
  2.  Capital Market Regulation. -- a.  Introduction. -- According to the 
conventional wisdom, in the 1950s and 60s Japanese bureaucrats motivated reluctant 
firms by rewarding them in the credit market.  There, the bureaucrats could do two 
things:  they could lavish low-interest government loans (particularly from the Japan 
Development Bank [JDB]) on compliant firms, and they could ensure the firms access to 
private bank loans.   
Bureaucrats could influence private loans, reason observers, because the 
government had taken three crucial steps.  First, it had disabled the securities markets.  
By strictly regulating both stock and bond markets, it had prevented firms from raising 
more than limited quantities in either.  When firms needed funds, they had little choice 
but to borrow from banks.  
  Second, the government used its control over foreign exchange to insulate the 
capital market from international competition.  As Dan Henderson (1986: 132) put it, it 
had “shield[ed]” the domestic market “from international market forces.”   
  Last, the government capped loan interest rates.  Through rigid caps, it had forced 
banks to lend at rates below those that would have prevailed in a competitive market.
19  
                     
17 Japan v. Idemitsu kosan, 985 Hanrei jiho 3 (Tokyo High Ct. Sept. 26, 1980), aff’d in part and 
rev’d in part, 1108 Hanrei jiho 3 (Sup. Ct. Feb. 24, 1984) (two of the firms and one of the executives were 
acquitted on appeal); Japan v. Sekiyu renmei, 983 Hanrei jiho 22 (Tokyo High Ct. Sept. 26, 1980) 
(acquitting the Petroleum Federation). 
18 Japan v. Idemitsu kosan, 1108 Hanrei jiho 3 (Sup. Ct. Feb. 24, 1984) (other than the convictions 
of two of the firms and one of the executives). 
19 So constrained were interest rates, argue some scholars, that banks sometimes circumvented 
them by requiring borrowers to take more than they needed and deposit the "compensating balance" in a 
low-interest-bearing account at the bank.  Through the ploy, they raised the effective interest rate on the Chapter 6:  Page 15 
Compelled to lend at rates that did not clear, banks had no choice but to ration the credit 
they provided.  By pressuring those banks, the government could then determine which 
firms borrowed and which went without.   
  None of this is true.  By the 1960s the financial markets did clear.  The 
government did not disable the securities markets, foreign firms did invest in Japan, and 
the interest-rate caps did not bind.  Because banks lent at market rates, the government 
could not have influenced the allocation of private credit. 
 
  b. Equity issues. -- Despite the many references in the literature to highly 
regulated securities markets, the Japanese government never seriously tried to restrict 
equity issues.  Instead, it merely imposed securities-registration and corporate-law 
requirements analogous to those in the U.S.  Facing no regulatory hurdles, firms issued 
stock in large amounts.  Take just the TSE-listed firms.  In 1964, they raised 531 billion 
yen through 533 issues.  In 1970, they raised 681 billion yen through 537 issues, and by 
1975 raised 1,001 billion yen through 285 issues (Tokyo, 1985: 110 tab. 37; through 
1970, $1 traded for about 360 yen, and in 1975 traded for 305 yen). 
  Overall, Japanese firms raised about the same fraction of their capital through 
equity as U.S. firms.  Although scholars do claim Japanese firms raise more money 
through debt than U.S. firms, they mislead.  Corrected for "differences in accounting," 
writes Stewart Myers (2001: 83), U.S. firms in 1991 had a book-debt/asset ratio of 33 
percent while Japanese firms had 37 percent.  They had a market-debt/asset ratio of 28 
percent while Japanese firms had 17 percent. 
  These numbers do not reflect recent cross-national convergence.  Instead, they 
merely repeat what Japanese scholars noted years ago.  As early as 1979, Kuroda & 
Oritani (1979) observed that U.S. firms maintained equity/asset ratios of 33.0 percent 
while Japanese firms maintained ratios of 47.4 percent.  Large U.S. firms had 
intermediated financing ratios of 50.4 percent while Japanese firms had ratios of 46.7 
percent. 
 
  c.  Bond issues.  Japanese firms did face more stringent limits on their ability to 
issue bonds, but the limits did not reflect regulatory practice.  Instead, they reflected anti-
competitive efforts by banks.  Despite those efforts, TSE-listed firms used bonds to raise 
substantial amounts.  In 1965, they raised 324 billion yen through 467 issues, in 1970 509 
billion yen through 306 issues.  By 1975, they raised 1,406 billion through 306 straight 
bond issues, 408 billion through 57 convertible issues, and another 372 billion through 52 
foreign issues (Tokyo, 1985: 111). 
  What is more, those firms that could not meet the bank-mandated issuing 
requirements could -- and did -- readily circumvent them.  Rather than sell bonds, they 
just borrowed directly from the institutional investors who would otherwise have bought 
their bonds.  When firms issue bonds in the U.S., they primarily sell them to institutional 
investors like insurance companies.  In Japan, although banks prevented many firms from 
issuing bonds, they did not prevent them from borrowing from insurance firms.  Rather 
than sell those firms bonds, the firms merely borrowed from them directly. 
                                                             
loan.  In fact, this largely did not happen -- for the simple reason that the regulated interest rates were not 
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  d.  The overseas market.  To regulate firm behavior through capital market 
controls, the Japanese government would have needed to insulate the Japanese market 
from foreign investors.  It did not.  Although it banned foreign investment "in principle," 
almost immediately it began to gut that "principle" through a variety of exceptions.  It 
started modestly:  from 1952 to 1960, foreign entities invested only $1.01 billion in 
Japan, and only 16 percent of that as equity. 
  During the 1960s, foreign investment boomed.  In 1961, foreigners invested $581 
million.  In 1963, they invested $904 million, and by 1967 $880 million.  Increasingly, 
they used the money for equity (and thus long-term) positions.  By 1971, they invested 
$4.3 billion, and 63 percent of that as equity (Tsusho, 1990: 402-10; Nihon ginko, 1974: 
210).  
  "In principle" the government banned foreign investment.  By the 1970s, it 
subjected that principle to an annual $3-5 billion exception. 
 
  e.  Interest rate caps. - - Whether the government could allocate credit depends 
crucially on whether the credit market cleared.  If banks lent at market interest-rates, 
anything the government did to direct funds would simply have produced offsetting shifts 
elsewhere.  Because the marginal cost of funds would generally have stayed at market 
levels, even loan subsidies would seldom have affected investment patterns.   
  During the 1960s, the government limited the maximum interest rate banks could 
charge their customers.  Subject to a variety of exceptions, it set the limit at 8.4 to 9.2 
percent.  It applied the limit, however, only to large short-term loans:  loans of more than 
1 million yen, and for terms of more less than 12 months.   
  The banking association imposed an even-more-stringent set of interest-rate caps, 
again on loans of more than 1 million yen for terms of less than 12 months:  during 1960-
86, a maximum of 5.5 to 8.4 percent (Zenkoku, various years; Nakabayashi, 1968).  The 
caps suggest a puzzle.  One might expect banks to impose a floor on loan interest rates.  
One might expect them to impose a cap on deposit interest rates.  One would not expect 
expect them to impose a cap on loan rates. 
  In fact, however, the puzzle is more apparent than real.  Fundamentally, the caps -
- even the bank-association-imposed caps -- did not bind.  In 1965, the large money-
center banks lent money at modal rates of 8.0 to 8.4 percent within a range of 6.2 to 9.5 
percent.  During the same period, the smaller regional banks (with their higher-risk 
borrowers), lent at modal rates that ranged from 8.4 to 8.8 percent withink a 6.2-9.9 
percent range (Zenkoku, various years).   
  Banks could lend at these high rates because they could so readily avoid the caps.  
For smaller borrowers, they could split the loans into smaller segments.  For the larger 
borrowers, they could lend the money for terms longer than one year.  After all, most 
loans they rolled over anyway.  Rather than lend at regulated rates for a year, they could 
lend at market rates for 13 months.  And so they did.  From 1960 to 1968, the larger 
banks made one-third to one-half percent of their loans on terms not subject to the bank-
association-imposed caps.  The regional banks made only one quarter to one-half of their 
loans within the caps. 
  Because the restrictions did not bind, firms in 1960s Japan borrowed at rates that 
reflected the factors that routinely determine interest rates in competitive markets.  They Chapter 6:  Page 17 
paid higher rates if they had volatile performance, for example.  They paid lower rates if 
they had a large stock of mortgageable assets (Miwa & Ramseyer, 2004a).   
 
  f.  Government loan programs.
20 -- Although the JDB did make subsidized loans, 
mostly it lent to firms in ocean shipping (Nihon zosen, 1980).  From 1961 to 1970, the 
government routed shipping firms over a third of the JDB’s entire loan base (an average 
of 204 billion yen a year).  In addition, to shipbuilding firms preparing vessels for export 
it routed nearly half its Export-Import Bank loans (a loan base averaging 247 billion yen 
a year).   
Although the loans transferred substantial wealth to the shipping firms, innovative 
shippers could flourish without them.  Indeed, the Sanko steamship firm flourished 
precisely because it did refuse to take them.  To Sanko, the subsidized loans came with 
too much government control.  Take the loans, it reasoned, and it could not offer its 
customers the services they demanded.  Accordingly, by the mid-1950s it decided to do 
without.  Rather than take the government’s subsidies and comply with its terms, it would 
raise its own funds and follow its own plans.  While its rivals stayed within the 
government’s orbit, it repaid its JDB loans and turned exclusively to private sources. 
Sanko jettisoned government subsidies all the way to the bank.  It had opened the 
1950s with virtually nothing.  It closed the 1960s as the most profitable firm in the 
industry.  During the last half of the decade, it earned shareholder returns of 32 percent a 
year, and by the early 1970s 62 percent.  Its closest rival during the late 1960s was 
Showa, but it earned only 17 percent and in the early 1970s only 32 percent.  Its closest 
rival during the early 1970s was Japan Lines, but it earned only 50 percent and in the late 
1960s only 9 percent.  
By the early 1970s Sanko had grown from the sixth ranked firm (in 1964) to the 
largest.  From a stock-market capitalization of 3.59 billion yen in 1964, it had boomed to 
514 billion yen by 1973, three-times its nearest rival.  Despite making no government-
"approved" vessels, it commanded a shipping capacity second only to Japan Lines.   
Despite collecting no government-subsidized loans, it serviced the third largest debt in 
the industry.   
  To be sure, OPEC changed all this.  Facing radically higher oil prices, western 
firms now cut the amount of oil they consumed and shipped.  Firms like Sanko that had 
invested heavily in tankers suffered accordingly.  Although in 1985 it filed for 
bankruptcy, it did have good company.  Government-favored firms lost heavily too.  By 
1988, the government-anointed Japan Lines failed as well. 
 
  3.  Foreign exchange controls. -- According to the legend of Sumitomo Metals, 
bureaucrats also motivated recalcitrant firms by withholding foreign exchange.  Claims 
Chalmers Johnson (1982: 194-95), the foreign exchange law constituted “the single most 
important instrument of industrial guidance and control that MITI ever possessed.”   
According to Richard Caves & Masu Uekusa (1976:  487-88), a “major sanction until the 
mid-1960s was the MITI’s authority over the allocation of foreign exchange for the 
purchase of essential inputs.”  Indeed, added they (id., at 489, ital. added), “[c]ontrols 
                     
20 For more details on the shipping industry and Sanko’s history, see the fuller account in Miwa & 
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over international transactions have often served as a club when gentle persuasion 
failed.”   
  To the best of our knowledge, before the Sumitomo Metals dispute MITI never 
used its powers over foreign exchange and trade to enforce unrelated policies (Nikkei, 
11/20/65).  To be sure, it did eventually try the ploy once -- in 1969, to enforce COCOM.  
It tried the ploy, and the Tokyo District Court declared it flatly illegal.   
  In fact, all this misses the fact that by 1969 the issue was almost entirely moot 
anyway.  By then, MITI had few foreign exchange control powers to wield, for the 
Japanese government had freed most imports.  The shift had begun in the late 1950s, 
when it decided to integrate Japan more fully into the international economy.  In 1960, 
measured by volume 44 percent of all imports were unrestricted.  By 1963 that fraction 
had reached 92 percent.
21  Only exceptionally (coal in the case of the LDP’s core 
constituents, or militarily sensitive equipment in the case of the COCOM dispute) could it 
review foreign exchange applications at all. 
 
III.  Keiretsu and Main Banks 
A.  Introduction: 
  If Japanese politicians gave their bureaucrats little power, then in most sectors 
those bureaucrats would not have constrained substantially the choices that economic 
actors faced.  If those politicians then chose to deregulate, the economic actors would not 
have faced substantially changed constraints either -- for there would have been few 
regulatory constraints to change.  And if through deregulation politicians changed few 
constraints, then those actors would not have changed their behavior in response. 
  As noted earlier, when Japan-specialists refer to the keiretsu groups and the main 
bank system, they do not refer to institutions.  Instead, they refer to what they see as 
idiosyncratic patterns of market behavior.  If in the 1980s and 90s Japanese politicians 
did not substantially change the regulatory framework that constrained economic actors, 
then those actors should not have changed substantially their market behavior.   
  Yet what does one see:  banks at the center of the keiretsu groups merge, and core 
members sell their stock.  In 2002 the former Sumitomo and Mitsui Banks merged into 
one bank.  The former Fuji and Daiichi Kangyo Banks merged into another.  The large 
Tokyo-Stock-Exchange-listed (TSE) firms sell the stock they own in other keiretsu 
members to generate paper profits.   
  And firms -- big, exchange-listed firms -- fail.  When they do, no bank offers to 
save them.  According to the main-bank theorists, the firms maintained implicit rescue 
contracts with their main banks.  Those firms now fail in large numbers, yet no bank tries 
to help.   
  Watching the spectacle unfold, observers proclaim the disintegration of the 
keiretsu and main-bank system.  In truth, neither phenomenon is disintegrating -- for 
                     
21 Komiya (1972: 71 tab. 2).  Thus, claims that liberalization essentially began in the 1980s (e.g., 
Schaede, 2000: 2) are simply wrong.  The details of industry-specific practice are crucial -- as much as 
western scholars routinely miss the point.  For example, statements like those by Kaplan (197x: 145) that 
“[u]ntil 1965 MITI directly controlled the importation and allocation of ... [steel] ore ... through the 
mechanism of foreign exchange import quotas” are flatly untrue.  Instead, by 1965 steel had already been 
freely importable for several years.   
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there were no phenomena to disintegrate.  The keiretsu never had economic substance, 
and the main bank system never existed.  Instead, both were figments of the academic 
imagination from the start.   
 
B.  The Keiretsu Corporate Groups:
22 
  1.  What are they? -- By most accounts, there are (or were) six of them:  the 
Mitsui, the Mitsubishi, the Sumitomo, the Fuji, the Daiichi-kangyo, and the Sanwa.   
Within each group, a massive money-center bank dominated the others.  Around it, 
dozens of industrial and service firms borrowed, built, and traded among themselves.   
  The firms also met regularly, the accounts continue.  Every month, the presidents 
of the firms met for lunch.  And at least the membership of these lunch clubs was clear 
enough.  A man is either invited or not invited.  Come noon on the second Thursday of 
each month, keiretsu or no keiretsu he must decide where he will eat his lunch. 
 
  2.  Who do they include?  Yet while the lunch-club invitation lists were clear, 
observers seldom used them.  For if they did, no one would have cared about the keiretsu.  
Moving the keiretsu from an academic sideshow to a central institution in Japanese 
business instead involved a crucial slight-of-hand:  coupling the accounts of regular 
presidential meetings with lists of hundreds (or thousands) of firms whose presidents 
were never invited.   
For what the lunch-club presidents had in common -- in truth, all they had in 
common -- was that they each ran a firm that had once been part of a zaibatsu.  Many of 
the firms were minor affairs.  As of 1967 (the alleged heyday of the keiretsu, and the 
earliest date for which we have invitation lists), the lunch clubs included firms like the 
Hokkaido Colliery and Steamship company (1965 market capitalization of 6.9 billion 
yen; at the then-current exchange rate of 360 yen/$, about $19 million).  They similarly 
included the Toshoku trading firm (3.0 billion), Mitsubishi Steel (2.8 billion), Mitsubishi-
Edogawa Chemicals (3.1 billion), Sumitomo Coal (3.2 billion), Mitsubishi Mining (3.5 
billion), and Mitsubishi Plastics (3.7 billion). 
  The lunch clubs could not conceivably have dominated the national 
economy.  As groups of ex-zaibatsu firms, many of their members competed in industries 
that had dominated the economy before the war but had since gone no where -- industries 
like mining, ocean shipping, warehousing, and cement.  In turn, they missed the firms 
most central to growth postwar.  By most accounts, the keiretsu were strongest in the 
mid-1960s.  Again as of 1967, the keiretsu lunch clubs omitted Toyota (1965 market 
capitalization of 135 billion yen), Toshiba (91 billion), Takeda Pharmaceuticals (61 
billion), Kinki Nihon Railway (43 billion), Honda (42 billion), Bridgestone Tire (42 
billion), Kajima Construction (37 billion) -- not to mention Matsushita Electric 
(Panasonic), Sharp, Sony, Kyocera, Suzuki, Cannon, and Nikon.   
  Even collectively, the lunch-club firms remained modest.  Take the number of 
employees in 1973 at all lunch-club firms, and compare it with the number of employees 
at several non-Japanese firms (Miwa & Ramseyer, 2002b: 193): 
Mitsui 259,084  IBM  268,130 
Mitsubishi 269,147  Siemens  302,000 
                     
22 The following account draws on Miwa & Ramseyer, 2002a, 2002b. Chapter 6:  Page 20 
Sumitomo 159,395  ITT  433,000 
Sanwa 414,731  Philips  386,500 
Fuji 345,549  GM  804,571 
DKB 546,312  Ford  458,463 
If one added all employees at the Mitsubishi lunch club firms, together they rivaled IBM.  
None of the groups even remotely approached GM.   
  For all the innuendo and speculation, we know of no lunch-club decision that 
mattered.   Occasionally, the lunch-clubs collectively decide whether to license the old 
zaibatsu trade names and trade marks.  For the 1970 Osaka World's Fair, they planned 
group displays.  Rumors allege that the Sumitomo group once tried to stop Sumitomo 
Metals and Sumitomo Chemicals from expanding their aluminum refining, and that the 
Mitsubishi group once tried to stop Mitsubishi Petrochemicals and Mitsubishi Chemicals 
from expanding ethylene production.  If they did, neither succeeded (Miwa & Ramseyer, 
2002b: 193). 
  As rhetorically crucial as they may be, economically the lunch clubs have always 
been trivial.  To avoid that triviality, most writers thus couple the accounts of the 
meetings with much longer lists of firms.  For those lists, they most commonly turn to the 
rosters published by the obscure Economic Research Institute (ERI) as the annual 
Research on the Keiretsu [Keiretsu no kenkyu] (ROK).   
  The ERI did not obtain its lists from the firms themselves.  Instead, it 
manufactured them.  In virtually all cases, it merely grouped exchange-listed firms by the 
source of their loans.  In turn, that loan data it obtained from the disclosure statements 
required by the Japanese securities law.   
  In general (it actually provided several quite different rosters), the ERI placed in a 
keiretsu those firms that borrowed the most from the (now long-independent) banks and 
insurers that before the war had been part of a given zaibatsu.  It classified as independent 
those that borrowed the most from any other financial institutions.
23  If the total a given 
firm borrowed from the Mitsubishi Bank, the Mitsubishi Trust Bank, the Tokyo Marine 
and Fire Insurance Co., and the Meiji Life Insurance Co., for example, exceeded the total 
it borrowed from any other similarly grouped set of financial institutions, the ERI placed 
the firm in the Mitsubishi keiretsu.  Only if it borrowed more from a non-keiretsu 
institution (generally, a much smaller regional bank) than the sum of its debt from any of 
these grouped money-center financial institutions did the ERI consider it independent. 
  Among observers who do not read Japanese, Dodwell Marketing Consultants 
posed the stiffest competition to the ROK.  Every few years since the early 1970s, it 
published its own keiretsu roster:  Industrial Groupings in Japan.  Where the ERI relied 
on loans, Dodwell apparently (it does not clearly explain the procedure) turned to equity.  
Apparently, it started with the lunch-club invitation lists.  To those lists, it then added 
those firms where lunch group invitees appeared prominently among the 10 largest 
shareholders.   
  If the different keiretsu definitions captured otherwise real but unobservable 
group characteristics, the ROK and Dodwell's should have produced similar rosters.  Yet 
even the ROK rosters themselves vary.  Because the ROK used several different 
                     
23 Given that the ERI based its rosters on loans, the firms obviously (by definition) borrowed 
heavily from keiretsu financial institutions.  For that reason, we do not discuss loan patterns below.  For 
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definitions, its own Mitsui keiretsu ranged from 48 firms in 1965 to 82 (1965 data).  
Because Dodwell's uses yet another definition, its rosters vary still more.  Indeed, the 
Mitsui group in Dodwell's has fewer than half its members in common with the principal 
ROK roster.  Only 48 to 65 percent of ROK members appear in the Dodwell roster of 
TSE Section-1 firms, and only 49 to 55 percent of the Dodwell members appear in the 
ROK lists (1975 data). 
 
  3.  What do they do?  a.  Trades. -- If the keiretsu mattered so much, one might 
have thought the members would trade with each other.  According to a survey by the 
Japanese Fair Trade Commission (Kosei, 1994: 139), however, manufacturing firms in 
1992 in the six lunch clubs sold a mean 12.58% of their output within the group.  They 
made most of these intra-group sales to the trading company, which then resold the goods 
elsewhere.  Other than sales to the trading company, they sold only 2.38% of their output 
within the group.  The amounts ranged from 5.57% (1.49%, excluding the trading 
company) for the Sanwa group, to 31.67% (0.61%, excluding the trading company) for 
the Sumitomo.   
These same manufacturing firms bought a mean 6.71% of their supplies within the 
group.  Again, much of this volume they bought from the trading company, which in turn 
acquired them elsewhere.  Other than purchases from the trading company, the firms 
bought only 2.24% of their supplies within the group.  The amounts ranged from 3.67% 
(1.23%, excluding the trading company) for the Fuji to 15.87% (5.40%, excluding the 
trading company) for the Mitsubishi. 
 
b.  Cross-shareholding. -- By most accounts, the keiretsu firms control each other 
through stock ownership.  Yet most of the non-financial firms invest nothing in other 
keiretsu firms.  Although the law generally let them buy stock in each other, they rarely 
did.  As of 1965 the 46 Mitsubishi non-financial firms could each have invested in 45 
other firms -- for a total of 2070 investment opportunities.
24  Of these, the firms made 
investments in 219, or 10.6 percent.  They made at least 1 percent investments in 61, or 
3.0 percent.  In only 11 cases (0.5 percent) did any non-financial firm hold more than 5 
percent of the stock of another.  The Daiichi firms made 1 percent investments in 4.8 
percent of the potential cases, Sumitomo firms in 3.7 percent, Mitsui firms in 2.6 percent, 
Sanwa firms in 2.1 percent, and Fuji firms in 1.8 percent.   
  Nor did the non-financial firms collectively own much stock of each other.  In the 
Mitsubishi keiretsu, the non-financial firms together held 4.9 percent of all outstanding 
shares of the group.  In the Sumitomo, they held 6.1 percent of the shares of member 
firms, in the Daiichi 4.8 percent, in the Mitsui 3.5 percent, in the Sanwa 2.1 percent, and 
in the Fuji 2.0 percent.   
Although the financial firms did hold stock in keiretsu members, the point 
misleads.  Where the law banned U.S. banks from holding corporate stock during this 
period, Japanese law allowed it -- and Japanese banks responded by diversifying broadly.  
Although they owned stock in keiretsu firms, they owned large amounts of stock in non-
keiretsu firms as well.  By law, until the late 1970s the financials could have held up to 
                     
24 We take the data from the ROK.  For shareholdings, it uses a different (and smaller) set of 
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10 percent of any other firm's stock, and had they wanted to control the firms they would 
have bought that 10 percent.  They did not.  Although the Mitsubishi Bank invested in 41 
of the 46 non-financial group members, it held more than 5 percent of the stock of only 8, 
and more than 8 percent of the stock of only 2.  The trust bank held more than 8 percent 
of only 3, the life insurer of only 3, and the casualty insurer of none (1965 data). 
If intra-group shareholdings were rare, true cross-shareholding arrangements were 
rarer still.  Equity investments seem consistently highest at the Sumitomo group, and in 
1965 there were 11 pairs of cross-shareholdings involving at least 1 percent there.  Yet 
among the Mitsui and Sanwa firms there were only six such pairs, among the Mitsubishi 
four pairs, among the Fuji three pairs, and among the Daiichi firms two.   
 
  4.  The invention of the “keiretsu.” -- Rather than regulatory bias or cultural 
idiosyncrasy, the keiretsu instead trace their roots to the academic politics of the early 
post-war years.  Although the right emerged from the chaos of war discredited, the left 
seemed poised to dominate Japan.  Within but a few years, Marxists solidly controlled 
university social science departments.  The extent of their control varied, but at the 
economics departments they excluded market-oriented scholars when they could.  At 
virtually all the departments, they at least framed the debates -- and they framed a bizarre 
set of debates indeed.  Take a few articles from a standard index of journal articles in 
economics for first half of 1967:  “Lenin’s Concept of Imperialism,” “Dehumanization in 
Marx’s Concept of Class,” “The Method of Monopoly Capitalism,” “New Currents in the 
World of Soviet Economics,” “A Study of ‘The Capital Accumulation Process’ in Part I 
Section 7 of Das Kapital,” and “Lenin’s Critique of Rosa Luxembourg’s ‘Theory of 
Capital Accumulation,'”  
To the contemporary economic scene, Marxists brought a theoretically driven 
need to find within the "contradictions" of "bourgeois capitalism" the "domination" by 
"monopoly capital."  In the 1930s, they had identified that “monopoly capital” with the 
zaibatsu.  By 1960, they were stuck.  Although still caught in the world of “bourgeois 
capitalism,” they faced ruthlessly competitive markets.  Their “monopoly capital,” it 
seems, was no where to be found. 
  Enter the ERI.  To a shrewd entrepreneur, a Marxist market niche is as good as 
any other.  If the Marxists could not find their “monopoly capital,” the ERI would invent 
it for them.  And so it did.  It called the monopoly capital “keiretsu,” compiled annual 
membership rosters, and sold university libraries the expensive subscription. 
To the Marxist-inclined, the ERI did have a plausible story to tell.  The war had 
largely bankrupted the family-controlled zaibatsu, but just to make sure the Americans 
had confiscated (actually, bought on credit and then massively inflated the currency) each 
family’s stock.  They then banned the old trade names besides.   
Once the Americans left in 1952, the government lifted the ban on the old names.  
Given the reputational capital the firms had earlier invested in those names, almost 
immediately they retrieved them.  Yet Marxist theory does not deal with reputational 
capital.  It does deal with “monopoly capital.”  When the formerly zaibatsu firms 
retrieved their old names, to a good leftist the action signaled nothing so much as a 
resurgence of the monopoly capital that had so cruelly dominated Japan before.   
Among these independently owned and operated formerly zaibatsu firms, the ERI 
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the firms that would dominate its bourgeois capitalist world.  The keiretsu, it proclaimed 
in 1960 (ROK, 1960: 3-4), were nothing other than "monopolistic organizations of giant 
firms ... that constitute trusts and industrial-capital combines.”  They “have a bank at their 
apex, and pursue their domination of capital through loans and their consolidation of that 
domination through equity ...." 
Within 1960s universities, it was an easy sell.  And sell the rosters the ERI did, 
for four decades.  In time, the Marxist terminology would disappear.  Until the 21st 
century, however, the rosters themselves did not.  Instead, they evolved into a convenient 
-- indeed mandatory -- set of dummy variables for any regression involving Japanese 
economic data.  
 
C.  The Main Bank System: 
  1.  Introduction.
25 -- Like the fable of the keiretsu, that of the "main bank system" 
starts with a bank.  Every large Japanese firm has a long-term relationship with a leading 
bank, begins the fable.  Call it the firm’s "main bank," that bank maintains an set of 
implicit contracts with the firm.  Under that implicit deal, it agrees to monitor the firm 
(often through board appointments).  It promises not just to monitor for itself, but to 
monitor on behalf of other creditors.  It agrees to intervene in governance (again, through 
board appointments) as appropriate.  And as necessary, it agrees to loan extra funds, to 
subordinate its claims to those of other creditors, and to send in experts to remake the 
firms. 
   By basic logic, the terms to the arrangement should trouble.  Given that a bank 
which commits itself to rescuing defaulting borrowers will attract the highest risk firms, 
banks would seem to do best if they refused ever to become a main bank.  Given that a 
bank that sends good money after bad usually loses both, banks that did agree to rescue 
troubled firms would seem to face incentives to renege after the fact.  Given that a bank 
often does best if it quietly pulls its loans at the first sign of trouble, banks would seldom 
want to promise to monitor “on behalf” of their rival banks -- and those rivals would not 
trust them if they did.  Given all these problems, if firms and banks did negotiate these 
terms, one would think they at least would do what insurance companies do with their 
own obligations:  draft fine-print contracts about each.   
  Yet according to the conventional wisdom, banks and firms draft none.  Indeed, 
according to that wisdom they do not just leave the “main bank contract” unwritten.  
They leave it unspoken to boot.  In the language of the literature, they negotiate their 
terms “implicitly” -- and to say that they negotiate them implicitly, of course, is to say 
that they negotiate them not at all.   
 
  2.  Some examples. -- At the firm level, the evidence at least shows that Japanese 
banks never tried to save all large troubled firms.  Even before the 1990s recession, they 
did not try to save them.  And if they did not try to save the firms that did fall into 
distress, they could not credibly (albeit implicitly) have promised to save the rest either.  
Consider several examples from Miwa & Ramseyer (2004b): 
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  a.  Mazda.  Consider Mazda.  As western observers recount the story (see 
Pascale & Rohlen, 1983), the firm entered the 1970s with an iron-willed, 
engineering-obsessed, and somewhat pig-headed CEO from the original Matsuda 
family.  Under his leadership, it invested heavily in rotary engines.  Alas, when 
the OPEC-induced price hikes hit in the middle of the decade, consumers 
abandoned the rotaries for the more fuel-efficient Toyotas, Nissans, and Hondas.  
To turn Mazda around, the Sumitomo Bank then stepped in as main bank.  It sent 
personnel, loaned money, repositioned the product line, enforced austerity.   
Through all that, it ultimately saved the firm.   
  Yet the way Mazda reacted to the bank belies the notion that they 
implicitly agreed that the bank would rescue the firm.  Had they cut such a deal in 
advance, the bank should not have faced the resistance it did after the fact.  In 
fact, as Pascale & Rohlen (1983: 233, 236) acknowledge, the firm fought the bank 
at every turn -- with its managers referring to the new arrivals as the “occupying 
army.”   
  Under pressure in December 1974, Mazda did accept several outsiders to 
its 30-member board.  Yet the new men did not come just from the Sumitomo 
Bank.  Instead, they came from the Sumitomo Trust Bank, two local banks, and 
the trading companies with which Mazda dealt as well.  Although Mazda named a 
Sumitomo Bank representative vice president in early 1976, it was late 1977 
before the outsiders could oust the pig-headed Matsuda as CEO.  When they did, 
they did not fire him or install a banker in his stead.  Instead, the firm named him 
chairman of the board and replaced him with its incumbent third-in-command, a 
long-term Mazda engineer.  By 1978, Mazda still had only four bankers on its 
board.   
  To keep Mazda alive, several institutions helped.  The Sumitomo Bank did 
lend money, but so did the Sumitomo Trust Bank.  In November 1979 Ford took a 
25 percent equity interest.  The director from the Trust Bank supervised capital 
budgeting issues, one director from the Sumitomo Bank managed exports while 
another directed accounting and cost-controls, the director from the C. Itoh 
trading firm coordinated sales, and the director from Sumitomo Trading took 
charge of managerial consolidation. 
  The legend in the West characterizes the Mazda “turnaround” as a story of 
main-bank rescue, but one should wonder.  The Sumitomo Bank never had the 
stake in Mazda that would induce a bank or firm to invest much in saving it.  
Although it had lent more to Mazda than anyone else, it had long kept its share of 
Mazda’s debt modest:  13.6 percent in October 1974 and 14.5 percent in October 
1977.  By October 1977 it was cutting the amount it lent Mazda:  from 53.6 
billion yen in October 1976 to 46.1 billion in October 1977, and by October 1980 
to 26.3 billion.  As of 1974 (and still in 1977) it held less than 4 percent of the 
stock.  Had it wanted to own more, at the time it legally could have held up to 10 
percent.  Instead, it kept its share even below that of the Nippon Life Insurance 
firm.   
  In truth, the Sumitomo Bank did not rescue Mazda.  Instead, the 
institutions with the greatest stake in the firm collectively rescued it.  None of 
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automotive engineering.  Instead, they lay in financial management and 
marketing.  Banks do know how to balance books, and trading companies know 
how to read consumer preferences and cultivate export markets.  What Mazda 
needed, these others could contribute.  They did, and Mazda survived.   
 
  b.  Eidai Industries:  Mazda still makes cars, but troubled firms do not 
always recover.  Sometimes, banks and trading partners intervene and fail.  Eidai 
Industries mass-produced pre-fabricated housing, and by the 1970s listed its stock 
on Section 1 of the Tokyo Stock Exchange.  In the mid-1970s it found itself 
outcompeted.  Out-maneuvered by its competitors, in December 1975 it posted a 
large loss.   
  Eidai’s banks had known of its travails already by late 1974.  To resolve 
those problems, in the fall of 1975 the largest five creditors agreed collectively to 
lend it more and to excuse it from its 2 billion yen semi-annual interest payment.  
True to their word, they lent large amounts.  From 1971 to 1977, they boosted 
their loans to Eidai from 7.5 billion yen to 75.3 billion.   
  The banks took a variety of other steps besides.  They enlisted the help of 
two trading firms that handled Eidai accounts.  They encouraged Eidai to increase 
its sales force.  They introduced clients to Eidai branches.  They placed three 
bankers on Eidai’s eleven-member board.  They replaced the Eidai president, first 
with a former president of a Daiwa-Bank-affiliated securities firm, then with the 
number-four man at Daiwa itself.   
  But monitoring a borrower effectively is hard.  If its rivals outcompeted 
Eidai, Eidai outfoxed its banks.  The second Daiwa-sent president had planned to 
rebuild Eidai within two years.  It was not to be.  Despite having had three 
bankers on its board and a banker in its vice presidential post even before the 
crisis, despite eventually accepting its president and fourteen other senior 
executives from the Daiwa Bank -- despite all this, Eidai carried problems that 
went deeper than any bank knew.  By 1978, one year after the ambitious second 
Daiwa-sent president took office, the banks petitioned the court for its 
reorganization.  “Banks know they’re easy to fool,” a senior Daiwa executive 
recalled (Chuo koron, Spec. Winter 1978 issue, p. 334).  “But they got fooled 
again anyway.”   
 
  c.  Sasebo Heavy Industries:  When a rescue occurs and a firm does 
survive, sometimes it survives only by happenstance.  During the 1960s and early 
70s, the Sasebo Heavy Industries (SHI) shipbuilding firm had thrived.  What with 
the explosive economic growth and the increasing need for large tankers (from 
firms like Sanko), demand had boomed.  Come 1977, however, the Arab oil 
embargo and the massive revaluation of the yen (from 290.3 yen/$ in January 
1977 to 195.4 in December 1978) had turned the boom into a bust.  With total 
industry shipbuilding capacity of 19 million tons, Japanese firms had 1977 orders 
of only 5 million.  At least the largest shipbuilding firms had diversified their 
product line.  Medium-sized SHI had not.  By the fall of 1978, it had no orders at 
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  Like most large Japanese firms, SHI had borrowed broadly.  From over a 
dozen banks, it had borrowed (as of March 1977) more than 79.7 billion yen.  
Among the commercial banks, it had borrowed the most from the Daiichi Kangyo 
Bank (DKB):  3.3 billion.  It had four major shareholders:  the Kurushima dry-
docks firm (25.0 percent), the Nippon Kokan (NKK) steel firm (24.2 percent), 
Nippon Steel (14.1 percent), and the Nissho Iwai trading firm (10.1 percent).   
Kurushima had bought its interest because its CEO Toshio Tsubouchi wanted to 
integrate SHI’s large dock facility into Kurushima.  When he had earlier tried to 
become president, however, NKK had blocked his move and instead engineered 
the appointment of its own representative.  
  To deal with the non-existent demand, in early 1978 SHI asked for early 
retirements.  By April 1,600 employees had volunteered, but to finance their 
retirement package the firm needed 8.2 billion yen.  It would also have to finance 
other changes, of course, and all told could expect to need about 20 billion.  When 
it approached its banks, however, they balked.  Rather than volunteer more 
money, they simply told it to file for bankruptcy.   
  The banks would agree to lend the money only if SHI’s lead shareholders 
guaranteed the debt, but the shareholders would not guarantee.  NKK controlled 
SHI, and Tsubouchi -- bitter still about the way NKK had blocked him from 
becoming president -- was not about to guarantee any loans suggested by its 
handpicked managerial team.  Absent a co-guarantee from Kurushima, neither 
would NKK guarantee a loan.  And if Tsubouchi and NKK would not guarantee, 
Nippon Steel and Nissho Iwai would not do so either.    
  In short, neither the firm’s creditors nor its shareholders would invest 
anything more in the firm.  Ordinarily, such a firm would promptly go bankrupt.  
It did not, but only because SHI dominated the city of Sasebo, and Prime Minister 
Takeo Fukuda owed the city a massive political debt.  When the government’s 
nuclear-powered ship “Mutsu” had developed a radioactive leak in 1974, all other 
ports had refused to take it.  With a leaking nuclear ship sitting off the Japanese 
coast and nowhere to send it, Fukuda faced a political disaster.  He averted it, but 
only when Sasebo agreed to take the ship. 
  For that favor Fukuda now intervened personally.  He struggled mightily 
to accomplish anything at all.  Repeatedly, he urged the banks to fund SHI.   
Repeatedly, they refused.  They would not loan the money unsecured and 
unguaranteed, they declared, and the firm could not secure and the shareholders 
would not guarantee.   
  Tsubouchi eventually did gain control and SHI did survive, but it survived 
largely without banks and only on a reduced scale.  From 79.7 billion in March 
1977, by 1979 its debt had fallen to 51.1 billion, by 1981 to 38.7 billion, and by 
1983 to 10.2 billion.  From 6968 employees in 1977, by 1979 its workforce fell to 
4223, by 1981 to 3422, and by 1983 to 2760.  
 
  d.  Other Cases.  Hanasaki.  Other distressed firms -- even big firms -- 
expeditiously go out of business.  In the early 1970s, with its 40-year history the 
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women’s clothing.  When it tried to expand in 1976, it found itself with enormous 
unsold inventory:  1.6 to 1.7 billion yen on annual sales of 18.5 billion. 
    “We begged it several times to come up with a consolidated 
rationalization plan, and a plan to rebuild,” recalled one Sumitomo Bank 
representative (Apareru, 1978: 81).  “But it wouldn’t comply.”  So, when in 
October it saw Hanasaki’s winter clothes moving slowly, the bank offset 200 
million yen’s worth of Hanasaki liabilities against Hanasaki’s deposits.  Early the 
next year it announced that “there are limits to a bank’s assistance,” and declared 
an end to all further loans.  Hanasaki promptly went out of business. 
 
 Hayashi.  Sometimes a rescue succeeds, but only after creditors 
manipulate the bankruptcy process to oust the incumbents.  The Hayashi firm had 
been one of the largest wool spinning firms in Japan.  When business fell in the 
1977, the founder-president resigned.  As his family had earlier pledged their 
stock in Hayashi Spinning to the Tokai Bank in exchange for its aid, they now 
sued to retrieve that stock.   
  Soon, rumors began to circulate that the family would liquidate the firm at 
the February shareholder’s meeting.  Apparently, they planned to use their equity 
stake to demand concessions from their creditors.  Afraid of losing control, the 
Tokai Bank promptly filed for reorganization under the bankruptcy laws.   
Through the bankruptcy proceeding, it cut the incumbent shareholders’ interests 
to less than 10 percent of the firm’s stock.  It then reorganized and revamped the 
firm.  The factories continued to operate with the labor force uncut -- but now 
under bank control. 
 
 Mitsumi.  And sometimes if banks try to intervene, the firms reject the 
banks and restructure on their own.  Electrical parts maker Mitsumi had fallen on 
hard times in 1970 after issuing bearer securities in Germany the previous year.  
In 1971 the Mitsui Bank sent in one of its men as Mitsumi vice president and 
another as director -- this in addition to the Mitsui banker already on the 10-
member board.  As of early 1970, the Mitsui bank as Mitsumi’s fourth-largest 
creditor had lent Mitsumi 340 million yen.  By 1972 it was its largest creditor and 
had 635 million outstanding.   
  Within a year the Mitsui officers had largely disappeared.  The vice 
president had become an ordinary director, and the other directors had vanished.  
Apparently, the incumbent managers -- still under the control of an autocratic 
CEO -- had fought the bankers and pushed them out.  Where Mitsumi had had 
3528 employees in January 1971, three years later it was down to 2002 
employees.  It survived, but for several years only on a much reduced scale.  
 
  3.  The evidence. -- If the “main bank system” ever functioned, the anecdotes in 
Section 2 suggest it functioned haphazardly at best.  Banks missed problems.  Firms 
failed.  Banks jettisoned them when they did.  Broader empirical evidence, however, 
suggests the system never functioned at all.  Indeed, the evidence suggests it never 
existed.  Consider the approximately 1000 firms listed on Section 1 (the largest firms) of Chapter 6:  Page 28 
the TSE in the 1980s and early 90s, and define the main bank as the bank that lends the 
most to a given firm.
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  a.  Governance by main banks.  Main banks seldom used board appointments to 
dominate firms.  During 1980, 1985, 1990, and 1995, 92 to 96 percent of the firms had no 
directors with appointments at the firm’s main bank.  At root, observers seem to confuse 
bankers with retired bankers.  The distinction matters critically.  If a bank hoped to use a 
board slot to monitor a firm, it would not name someone who had retired from the bank, 
could not return to the bank, and relied on that firm for his income.  Notions of 
“Confucian loyalty” do not reach that far, and the banks themselves never located future 
jobs for their officers once they left.  Instead, the bank would send a relatively young 
executive on the bank payroll who forfeited his career if he showed himself disloyal.   
  Yet when Japanese firms do appoint bankers to their board they name retired 
bankers, and even of those they appointed very few.  During our four years, where only 
4-8 percent of the firms had a director holding a bank position concurrently, 53 to 56 
percent of the firms did have a retired banker on their board.  They did not have many, 
though.  The mean firm had only 0.2 to 0.3 directors with a concurrent bank position, and 
1.1 retired bank officers. 
 
  b.  Delegated monitoring.  Main-bank theorists do not just claim that the main 
bank monitored its debtors.  After all, good banks everywhere monitor their debtors.  
Rather, they claim that the main bank monitored on behalf of all other banks.  Rather than 
waste their resources duplicating each other's efforts, the banks collectively delegated 
monitoring to the firm's main bank.   
  The hypothesis has an obvious testable implication:  if Japanese banks monitor 
through board appointments and delegate that monitoring to a firm's main bank, then 
virtually all banker-directors should come from the main bank.  By contrast, if banks do 
not delegate, then banker-directors should come from a variety a banks.  Given that the 
firm will have closer ties to its main bank than to others (after all, by definition it has 
borrowed the most from that bank), it may appoint more directors from the main bank 
than elsewhere.  If but only if banks delegate their monitoring to the main bank, however, 
will all banker-directors come from the main bank.  
  Banker-directors do not come only from the main bank.  Instead, they come from 
a variety of banks.  As of 1985, of their retired banker-directors firms appointed 57 
percent from their main bank.  They appointed 1.1 mean retired banker-directors in total.  
They appointed a mean 0.6 from their main bank.   
 
  c.  Main bank rescues.  Main-bank stability. -- According to most accounts, 
Japanese banks implicitly agreed to rescue those distressed clients for which they acted as 
main bank.  Effectively, the accounts claim that main banks offered implicit insurance 
policies against financial or economic distress.  The claim suggests several testable 
propositions. 
  First, if firms purchase implicit insurance from their main bank, then firms should 
switch main banks seldom and those closest to insolvency should switch never.  After all, 
                     
26 We take the empirical evidence from Miwa & Ramseyer, 2003. Chapter 6:  Page 29 
the firm (by hypothesis) has paid the premiums on its policy for years.  It will not -- at the 
very point when it can expect to start collecting on the policy -- try to switch carriers.   
  In fact, main bank relations were anything but stable -- either among the 
profitable or the unprofitable.  During each the half-decade, over a fifth of the firms 
found a new main bank.  Just as the more profitable firms switched, so too did the less 
(the differences are not statistically significant):  during 1980-85 28 percent of the firms 
in the least profitable quartile switched main banks, while 30 percent of the others did, 
during 1986-90 23 percent of the least profitable switched while only 20 percent of the 
others did, and during 1990-94 27 percent of the least profitable shifted while 28 percent 
of the others did.   
 
 Main-bank  dependence.  Second, if main banks offered implicit insurance against 
financial distress, the firms most likely to have "collected" on the policies would have 
been those closest to insolvency.  If so, then on average the nearly insolvent firms should 
have owed a larger fraction of their loans to their lead bank than the other firms owed. 
  The phenomenon does not occur:  main banks had not loaned a larger share of a 
firm's debt to the least profitable firms than to the others (none of the differences are 
statistically significant).  During 1980-85, the least profitable quartile of firms borrowed 
from their main bank 27.8 percent of their loans while the others borrowed 30.6 percent.  
During 1986-90 the least profitable quartile borrowed 32.0 percent from their main bank 
while the other firms borrowed 33.9 percent.  During 1990-94, the least profitable 
quartile borrowed 34.4 percent, while the others borrowed 33.8. 
 
  Change in main-bank dependence.  If the main bank implicitly agreed to shoulder 
a disproportionate amount of the additional loans troubled firms needed, then as firms 
entered financial distress they should also have increased the fraction of the debt they 
borrowed from their main bank.  On average, a main bank would have lent additional 
funds to healthy firms roughly proportional to its share in the firm's existing debt.  To the 
financially distressed firm, however, it should have increased that share.   
  This did not happen:  the least profitable firms did not increase the fraction they 
borrowed from their lead bank.  Again, partition the TSE firms by profitability quartile in 
1980-85, 1986-90, and 1990-94.  Now compare (a) the mean increase in the fraction of its 
debt a firm borrowed from its main bank at the least profitable quartile against (b) the 
mean increase at the others.  According to the standard accounts, the increase should have 
been larger among the distressed firms than among the others.  It was not.  During 1980-
85 and 1986-90, the main bank increased its share of a firm's debt more at the top three 
quartiles than at the bottom.  During 1990-94, it cut its debt share less drastically at the 
top three quartiles than at the bottom.  Again, none of the differences are statistically 




 Expertise.  Last, main-bank theorists typically claim banks helped troubled firms 
by dispatching experienced officers to the firm.  As the anecdotes above relate, 
sometimes banks did indeed send their officers to troubled firms.  Yet seldom did those 
officers “rescue” the firms -- for fundamentally they did not know how.  Bankers may be Chapter 6:  Page 30 
smart, but they needed more than smarts to run an industrial firm.  They needed 
experience, and that they did not have.  Some of them had successfully run financial 
intermediaries, but none had built cars or sold detergents.  “The biggest problem with 
having a bank control management,” complained one businessman, “is that bankers can’t 
stop thinking like bankers.  Sure, they can cut personnel and inventory.  But they don’t 
seem to realize that even in the middle of all the cut-backs, you’ve got to plan for the 
future and invest in the right facilities” (Ginko kanri, 1978: 87).  As Mansaku Takeda 
(1978: 41), senior consultant to the Daiichi Kangyo Bank, put it, “banks are places to 
oversee loans.  There’s no reason think a banker has any talent for running a firm, and 
there’re precious few examples of firms that did better because a banker came to run 
them. ...  Sure, bankers may be smart.  But whether they have any managerial talent is 
another issue.” 
 
IV.  Conclusions: 
  Has Japan changed its ways?  Has it dismantled its developmentalist regulations?"   
  Have you, dear reader, stopped beating your spouse? 
  The Japanese government has not dismantled its developmentalist (or any other 
heavily interventionist) regulatory regime, for (except in a very few sectors) it had no 
such regime to dismantle.  At least since the 1960s, regulators controlled few means by 
which to induce firms to comply.  Firms and banks have not dismantled their keiretsu 
corporate groups, for they had no such groups to dismantle.  Even in their purported 
heyday of the 1960s, the groups never constituted anything more than the feverish 
figment of an over-active Marxist imagination.  Firms and banks have not dismantled 
their main bank arrangements, for they had no such arrangements to dismantle.  Banks 
never dominated firm governance, secondary banks never delegated monitoring to a 
firm’s main bank, and banks never agreed (even implicitly) to rescue firms in distress.   
  The economy in post-war Japan was a competitive market economy rather than a 
controlled one -- and it grew rapidly for just that reason.  The government did not heavily 
regulate markets, large groups of firms did not stifle competition, and banks did not 
control firms.  Instead, firms bought and sold, borrowed and lent, and thrived or failed -- 
on highly competitive markets. 
  It is one thing (and apparently a popular thing in the academy) to speculate about 
the effect of institutional change on market behavior.  It is another thing entirely (and in 
the Japanese context apparently an abandoned art) to study the institutional arrangements 
actually in place.  Until we know what institutions actually exist, however, we cannot 
expect to know the effect that any change in those institutions might have on the market 
choices economic actors make.  Know thy data, Zvi Grilliches told generations of 
budding Harvard econometricians.  Office-chair theorists would do well to learn a little 
data too.  
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